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INTRODUCTION
In 1998 the UK Department of Media, Culture and Sports (DCMS) 
under Chris Smith defined the creative industries as:
“… those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, 
skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job 
creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual 
property.”
The DCMS then went on to list the ‘creative industries’ as follows:
 1. Advertising.
 2. Architecture.
 3. Art and antiques.
 4. Crafts.
 . Design.
 . Designer fashion.
 . Film and video.
 8. Interactive Leisure Software (Computer Games).
 9. Music.
10. The performing arts.
11. Publishing.
12. Television and radio.
13. Software and computer services.
While this is a perfectly workable definition it is worth bearing in 
mind that it is as arbitrary as most other definitions. 
‘Creativity’ is – as the word implies – the concept of creating 
something new, whether totally original (rare) or by combining 
different pre-existing components (much more common). There are 
clearly different kinds of creativity, and one interesting perspective 
is provided by Arthur Koestler (The Act Of Creation, 194) and Paul 
Birch/Brian Clegg (Crash Course In Creativity, 2002) who list three 
types of creative individual:
Type Creates Reaction Primary 
sphere*
Primary legal means 
of protection 
[if available]*
1. The Artist Beauty or 
challenge
“Aaahh!”
Emotional / 
Artistic
Copyright, Trademarks
2. The Jester Humour, 
entertainment
“Ha ha”
Emotional / 
Artistic
Copyright
3. The Sage Ideas or 
solutions
“Ah ha!”
Rational / 
Scientific
Patents, Copyright
It is worthwhile to note that most people’s definition of ‘creative 
business’ tends to focus around ‘Artist’ or ‘Jester’ type creativity, often 
excluding the ‘Sage’.
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For example, of the thirteen creative businesses types listed by the 
DCMS, only one (#13: Software and Computer Services) is based on 
pure-play scientific/rational creativity. 
Some, e.g. John Howkins, The Creative Economy, 2001, would argue 
that this is a mistake, which skews the picture of creative industry 
as a whole too much towards the emotional side of creativity. In 
his list of creative businesses Howkins includes the category R&D, 
comprised of the (mainly in-house) research and development 
activities of the world’s major corporations, a very major economic 
activity. Arguably a large number of professional services activities 
(e.g. legal, consulting, investment banking) also rely on measures 
of originality similar creativity in the classical sense. One should 
certainly not assume that ‘creativity’ is the exclusive realm of the 
‘creative’ professional, however it is easy to fall into the ‘everyone is 
creative ‘ trap that misses the point of a worthwhile attempt to focus 
on a key driver of future wealth.
In their recent paper Beyond The Creative Industries, NESTA 2008, the 
authors estimate that their as many ‘creative’ jobs outside the DCMS 
categories as there are within – what is more over half the jobs in the 
DCMS categories are not ‘creative’ by any definition (just think of the 
list of jobs on the credits of any film!). Suffice to say the definition 
of what is and what isn’t a creative business is a matter of degree, 
however there is no doubt that economic activity that is based upon 
creativity is central to the success of any ‘post industrial’ economy 
like the UK. 
ANOTHER VIEW
Another, and also potentially very fruitful, way of looking at creative 
industries is to look at their underlying economic characteristics, as 
pioneered by Richard Caves in his book Creative Industries – Contacts 
Between Arts And Commerce, (Harvard University Press, 2001). Caves 
identifies seven key characteristics: Nobody Knows, Art for Arts Sake, 
Motley Crew, Infinite Variety, Winner Takes All, Time Flies and Durable 
and Replicable.
These factors are worth examining in some more detail as they give 
us a more robust framework for identifying the underlying business 
models that lie at the heart of creative businesses and hence the 
managerial levers that can (and cannot) be applied to enhance 
performance. 
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“NOBODY KNOWS”
It is exceptionally difficult to estimate the demand for creative 
products and services in advance. Consumers will generally only 
know if they like a creative product or service when they see the fully 
finished version. This in itself makes creative business riskier. 
This risk is compounded by the fact that costs invested in creative 
production are generally both sunk and fixed. Sunk means that the 
costs are irreversibly committed – there is no scrap value for a half-
finished film or sculpture! Fixed means that the costs do not vary by 
output – for example producing, marketing and showing a film costs 
the same regardless of how many people turn up for the show.
There are a number of significant commercial implications for this. 
Most obviously, the high level of risk means that an organization 
with a few or just one project is gambling its future on the outcome 
of every single one. If the project is a success, the shareholders 
will win big and employees will get kudos (and maybe even a 
bonus). If it’s a flop, the shareholders will lose everything, and the 
employees will lose their job (and possibly their reputation too). 
Larger organizations with multiple projects are better able to pool 
and distribute risk – this is one driver of concentration in creative 
industries, and a big factor behind the existence of big film studios.
Another aspect is the value of options in a creative project, or more 
properly real options, i.e. the right, but not the obligation to proceed 
with the project at certain milestones. Let’s take a film project as an 
example. Grossly simplified, assume the situation set out below:
We are developing a large-ish Hollywood-style action movie, with a 
$m development and marketing cost. There is a 10% chance of a 
hit with $3m revenue, and a 90% chance of a turkey which makes 
only $40m revenue. The expected monetary value ($3 x .1 + $40 
x.9 = $3.) of this project is a negative $1.m ($ – $3.), and no 
sane studio executive would greenlight it.
Let us now consider the real options inherent in this project, and 
use them constructively. We do this by splitting the projects into 
separate stages and inserting milestones/ decision points, just like 
a venture capitalist. The project needs to pass each milestone with 
flying colours. If it doesn’t, we have the option of binning it, saving 
us throwing good money after bad. We may also have lower risk 
commercialisation options, e.g. saving money on a global marketing 
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campaign by going straight to video for a project that is so-so, rather 
than great. Acting in this way totally changes the economics of the 
project.
First we have to insert three decision nodes up front, over which 
we are in control. If the script doesn’t look good, even after editing, 
we’ll bin the entire project, and save the shooting and marketing 
expenses. Painful, but better than shooting and marketing a film 
with a poor script. If the finished film doesn’t look good, we’ll stop it 
there and then, and save marketing expense. If it test screens poorly, 
we may drop the global marketing campaign and save what we can, 
by putting it straight to video.
We are still not in control over whether it’s a hit or a flop, but by 
weeding out bad scripts, bad shoots and badly tested movies we 
have also increased the chances of a hit (in this assumed example 
from 10% to 20%) giving a positive EMV.
 
Negotiations and trading of creative options are obviously a critically 
important subject and at the heart of an efficient ‘movie industry’ 
comprising a critical mass of producers, directors, financiers and 
lawyers thus creating specialist clusters in Hollywood, New York and, 
some would claim, London.
“ART FOR ART’S SAKE”
While employees working in ‘non-creative’ industries may (or not!) 
take great pride in their work, they tend to ultimately believe 
that satisfying the consumer and achieving commercial success 
is the real arbiter of quality and performance. A lot of creative 
people meanwhile, care more about the estimation of their peers 
than about success in the marketplace. Quite often this will mean 
diversion of effort from what the customers are willing to pay for to 
what the creative think is the best expression of his or her creative 
impulses. 
An almost clichéd example is the advertising agency creative 
director who would rather do a really funny and edgy commercial 
(and receive accolades in Cannes) than execute on the more 
humdrum ‘busy mom with kids’ - testimonials that shift detergent in 
Croydon. Another is the movie director who wants a dark, despairing 
ending, while the studio executives want smiles and happiness 
to maximize appeal to e.g. dating couples. [e.g. Ridley Scott Blade 
Runner]. 
The commercial implications of this are a need to create the happiest 
possible compromise between the creatives’ need for self-expression 
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and commercial reality. Too ‘creative’ could scare away the customers 
and leave the company a disorganized mess. Too ‘commercial’ could 
scare away the creatives and leave the company a soulless hulk 
with nothing credible to offer. Though of course some creatives are 
willing to operate where others sneer, as Jack Vettriano, Mills & Boon 
and the Franklin Mint clearly demonstrate. 
“MOTLEY CREW/ WEAKEST LINK”
Most creative businesses require the input of several different 
creatives, as well as non-creatives. Think of a movie production, 
with everyone from directors to actors to special effects producers 
and production accountants all working on a single project. Every 
contributor must perform well, for the overall result to be successful. 
The commercial implications of this are that team selection and 
management skills are at a premium. It is very difficult to enforce 
performance through contracts – if the motivation and talent isn’t 
really there, no contractual obligations can bring it out. Hence 
people are very much hired by their reputations. Firstly, for the 
obvious reason that quality people tend to have quality reputations. 
Secondly, and with a bit more sting in the tail, people who worry 
about losing a great reputation will be much more inclined to 
perform well. The reputation issue is one of the many reasons why 
newcomers find it so difficult to break into the creative industries.
Another aspect is the value of established teams, who know and 
respect each other, and work well together. Getting a team on 
board is much less risky than hiring individuals and expecting them 
to blend. This is one reason why for example film production and 
advertising teams may stay together for years, moving between 
several different employers or projects.
“INFINITE VARIETY”
Creative products have many more dimensions of difference than 
normal products and are less amenable to rational comparison. 
There are two aspects to this. The first is that there is an infinity of 
creative expressions possible – a blank canvas can be turned into 
any painting, or even a sculpture. The second is that whether or not 
creative products are in fact very different or not, it is difficult to 
rationalize a choice between them (unlike e.g. a lawnmower or a 
fridge).
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The commercial implications of this include the need for expert 
agents (e.g. art galleries, literary editors) to evaluate the hundreds 
of thousands of new creative products (paintings, manuscripts) 
being created each year and choosing a select few for exhibition or 
publication. For example, out of fifteen thousand unsolicited novel 
manuscripts received by major US publishers each year, 1 (one) is 
selected for publication.
Another aspect is the need for a large and diverse stock to cover e.g. 
the book, music or film market. For example, a book store may have 
to store dozens of different variants of ‘historical dramas’ or ‘teenage 
horror flicks’ to be reasonably sure of covering demand – just 
stocking the Da Vinci Code does not a bookstore make.
“A-LIST / B-LIST / WINNER TAKES ALL / SUPERSTAR”
These really are a number of related and similar effects.
The A-list/B-list effect is that creative performers are subject to a rigid 
(though rapidly changeable!) hierarchy of perceived quality. End 
consumers generally have a strong preference for A-list performers. 
The reasons for this include mass psychology and opportunity cost 
(you spend the same amount of time at the concert, whether it’s 
Joe Unknown or U2, but seeing Joe Unknown gives few kudos with 
your mates). The effect of this obviously carries over to creative 
entrepreneurs/ employers, who build their roster of actors, directors 
etc., according to what will pull in the consumers.
This all means that B-list (or lower down) performers often 
aren’t really substitutes for A-list stars. Hence, the A-list will earn 
disproportionately much more than the B-list, and – to add insult 
to injury – will also be much busier (i.e. attract more bookings). The 
commercial implications of this is that judicious tradeoffs have to be 
made between the huge extra costs but also undoubted advantages 
related to the choice of A-list versus B-list players. And if you are a 
B-list star, it’s worth really making a splash to make it into the A-list 
(hence why plastic surgeons and scandal magazines are busy).
Note that the superstar effect is not isolated to the creative 
industries – over the last several decades it has been seen in 
industries as diverse as share analysts, lawyers, chief executives and 
business school professors. Also, it is becoming more prevalent, 
as global communications improve – the bigger the market (and 
audience) the stronger the effect becomes.
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“TIME FLIES”
The profitability of creative projects is highly dependent on strong 
coordination during project execution and on avoiding delays 
between completion and going to market.
The coordination aspect is the same as for any large and complex 
project in any industry. All the pieces and players need to be 
available at the same time, to avoid inefficiency and waste. For 
example, movie or recording studio facilities are very expensive, and 
careful coordination is necessary to avoid costly delays.
Secondly, once the project is ‘in the can’ (and all the costs have 
been incurred), it is imperative that the project hits the market and 
starts earning revenue as soon as possible. This will be no surprise 
to anyone familiar with the concept of time discounting and net 
present value – a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, 
or in a year’s time. 
The commercial effect of this is that any complex creative project 
needs strong project management to avoid potentially catastrophic 
waste and inefficiency. The production debacle around Francis 
Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now is not an experience many studio 
executives would care to replicate.
“DURABLE AND REPLICABLE”
Most creative products can be cheaply stored and easily replicated, 
particularly now in an era of digital storage and distribution.
The commercial effect of this is that (copy) rights management is 
key to profitability in the creative product industries. This can be 
relatively straightforward when there is just one ‘big’ work involved 
in one geography, but rapidly gets extremely complex with lots of 
smaller rights of different kinds, in different geographies, collecting 
maybe just a few pence per work at a time.
For example, the rights administration issues involved in J.K. 
Rowlings’ Harry Potter empire are very considerable. The book rights 
alone are complex, with the book printed in sixty-one languages, 
and distributed in two hundred countries. The film rights are held by 
Warner Brothers, while the toy rights have been licensed by Warner 
to Mattel, which has sold more than $10m of Harry Potter toys. The 
video games right are held by Electronic Arts, and in addition Harry 
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Potter has been placed on mugs, coasters, balloons, chocolates, a 
Hornby train set and lots of other products from which the rights 
owner extracts a (relatively) risk free royalty.
CREATIVE BUSINESSES
DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES
Creative 
process
businesses
•     Professional services firms delivering a 
creative service to clients on demand.
•     Mainly business-to-business.
•     Do not generally retain IP (but may have it in 
internal processes).
•     Strong talent management is key.
•     Architects.
•     Advertising / PR / Branding and other 
marketing services firms.
•     Design agendas.
Creative 
product 
businesses
•     ’Content’ or brand creation businesses 
– that create a replicable product/output that 
is usually protected by intellectual property 
law.
•     ’Hit’ businesses - instinct for the winning 
product and IP protection is key.
•     ’Content’ or Brand creation businesses   
that create a replicable product/output 
that is usually protected by intellectual 
property law.
•     ‘Hit’ businesses – instinct for the winning 
product and IP protection is key.
Media 
businesses
•     Content ‘distribution ‘ businesses 
delivering a creative product to a 
community or audience, to educate, 
inform or entertain them.
•     Emphasis on continuous content 
development or usually purchase from CP 
suppliers.
•     Multiple often recurring revenue streams 
e.g. advertising / subscription / pay per view 
/ ancillary.
•     More focus on efficient operations than for 
two other types – timeliness is often key 
to value.
•     Newspapers and magazines.
•     TV and radio broadcast.
•     Theatres and event venues.
•     Museums and galleries.
•     Cinemas.
•     On-line communities.
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CREATIVE BUSINESSES
Applying these criteria to the wide range of ‘Creative Industries’ laid 
out by DCMS et al provides some useful insights. Reclassifying the 
long list into three broad groups based on their principle business 
models i.e. the ways in which they create and capture value and the 
overall systems by which various types of creative business compete, 
survive and make a return on the financial or social capital invested 
in them. 
This analysis leads us to the following categories of Creative Process, 
Creative Product and Media businesses. It is worth noting that only 
the Creative Product businesses meet the Smith and Caves tests for 
Creative industries.
CREATIVE PROCESS BUSINESSES
These are a highly diverse group of professional services businesses 
ranging in size from one-man consultancies to global behemoths 
like the WPP marketing services group, with seventy thousand 
employees spread across seventeen hundred offices in one hundred 
and four countries.
COPYRIG
HT PROT
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Their common characteristic is that they deliver a creative service 
(typically described as projects) to customers (typically described as 
clients). Unlike creative product businesses, which provide multiple 
(possibly millions) of impressions of the same creative product, 
the output of the creative process business is highly bespoke to 
the individual needs of clients. Another difference is that creative 
process industries mainly service business customers, whereas 
the end users of creative product industries are overwhelmingly 
consumers.
As will be apparent with the other type of creative business as 
well, only a fraction of the activity of the creative process firm is 
actually ‘creative’ in the core sense of the word. In a lot of ways, 
the creative process firm is actually more similar to much more 
traditional professional services businesses, such as law firms and 
accountancies, than to the other types of creative business.
A very significant driver of market structure in the UK creative 
services industry is the ever-present tension between economies 
and diseconomies of scale, scope and learning combined with the 
very low barriers to entry.
Economies of scale occur where you can employ the same asset (e.g. 
a printing press) to produce more goods/services (e.g. a magazine) 
at small additional cost. The average cost per copy will be lower, the 
more you produce.
Economies of scope occur where you can do more (different) 
things with the same asset. For example, your existing finance 
department may well be able to also cover financial management 
of an acquisition you make, enabling you to cut overall finance 
department costs.
Finally, economies of learning enable you to reduce cost over 
time, as you learn what works best and weed out inefficiencies in 
the process. This works in manufacturing but works particularly 
strongly in services and creative industries. For example, a strong, 
experienced movie production crew will be much, much more 
efficient than a set of novices. Similarly, an experienced group 
of advertising professionals will not only be able to do a better 
campaign than amateurs – they will also do it much more quickly. A 
set of established processes gives you a huge head start.
It would seem that economic forces are all on the side of the ‘big 
battalions’, and indeed the last ten to fifteen years have seen the rise 
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of massive creative services conglomerates such as WPP, combining 
literally hundreds of creative services businesses under one roof. On 
the other hand, start-ups continue to flourish [though admittedly 
the downturn from 2000-2004 has proved a rather more bracing 
climate than most creative services entrepreneurs would have 
hoped for].
The reason why the companies don’t end up as just a few large 
players in each industry, tempered only by monopoly/competition 
regulation, is that there are diseconomies of scale, scope and 
learning as well.
You can grow so large that it becomes difficult to control quality and 
maintain motivation. Or you may become ever better at efficient 
delivery of a particular kind of product or service – but in the 
meantime the marketplace has moved on.
On the one hand, there clearly are benefits from being large in 
creative professional services. Big clients will consider you more 
credible for big projects. Over the last decade, big clients have also 
tended to concentrate their international activities with one or few 
firms, which has benefited large firms, with international reach. The 
large company will have more resources to invest in building its 
business. It can also benefit from cross-selling between different 
services, and clients can benefit from having an integrated service 
provided under one roof. Finally, the large company can offer good 
quality shared services (for example financial management) that 
most creatives in smaller firms find a disruptive chore.
It’s not all great for the giants however. Firstly not all clients 
appreciate having the same service provider as competitors, even 
considering Chinese walls. They might not believe that cross-selling 
benefits them, and may prefer to mix and match across different 
providers. Also, the leading edge talent and entrepreneurial types 
often feel stifled in large organizations. Finally, large companies, 
containing lots of vested interests and general inertia, will generally 
just be slower off the mark in capturing new opportunities.
Another factor driving market structure is barriers to entry, i.e. 
whether it’s easy or difficult to become a credible player in the 
industry.
In general, the barriers to entry in agency type businesses are quite 
low compared to a lot of other industries. While some years ago you 
might have required very expensive IT systems to deliver credible 
Art Design for example, you can now get professional systems for a 
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few thousand pounds. With IT just getting cheaper all the time, the 
investment barrier keeps getting lowered.
Similarly, clients (or other agencies) don’t actually mind working with 
very small outfits, as long as they are good. Staff – once they have 
their basic experience – tend to be very mobile, and very willing 
to join a new creative bandwagon. The unit of exchange tends to 
be the teams of possibly no more than four to five people – one of 
those is quite enough to serve even quite large clients.
Another factor is the lack of professional certification – anyone can 
set up shop in advertising regardless of degree or no degree or 
where they trained (or didn’t train). There have been some voluntary 
attempts at creating various professional bodies in advertising, but 
their real impact on shaping client demand and entry to the industry 
seems less than decisive so far.
Just compare with the situation for investment banking, where 
you need massive IT systems and other infrastructure (e.g. equity 
sales), clients much prefer to work with the global #1 and staff are 
loath to leave first tier banks for second tier banks, let alone start-
ups. Investment banking is also massively regulated, with need for 
regulatory approvals of activities though their effectiveness may be 
open to question.
Overall these various factors have combined into maintaining 
the creative services industry as a fertile zone for entrepreneurial 
endeavour. So while there is some evidence of increasing 
consolidation over the last ten to fifteen years, it has probably 
been concentrated amongst the large players, i.e. the small players 
remain as fragmented as ever, and there is a constant stream of new 
entrants to the industry.
CREATIVE PRODUCT BUSINESSES
This is, if possible, an even more diverse group than the creative 
process industries. It ranges from the struggling ‘artist in the attic’ 
to global publishing behemoths like Random House [part of the 
Bertelsmann Group], fashion giants like Armani, LVMH, Max Mara 
and Gucci or movie studios like Universal.
Their common characteristic is that they deliver a creative product, 
either directly to consumers or via a media business intermediary 
(see the section on Media Businesses below). They differ from 
creative process industries in delivering a uniform product rather 
than a bespoke service, and by doing this in (generally) multiple 
copies, thousands or even millions. Typically creative product 
industries are consumer industries, unlike the business-to-business 
oriented creative process industries.
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There are in the main two types of business in this space, though the 
bulk of actual creative product industries combine elements of both. 
The first type is the publishing business. A publisher relies on a large, 
independent external group of artists, writers, singers etc. to provide 
it with works to evaluate and select from, before proceeding to the 
production and distribution stage.
The second type is the studio business, which is more in the 
driving seat in relation to the creative input. The studio business 
will commission creative work (either in-house or outsourced) to a 
set of specifications, rather than just wait for appropriate works to 
pass by, edit until satisfied and then proceed to the production and 
distribution stage.
Book and record publishers are examples of pure publishing 
businesses, while computer games businesses tend to be studio 
based. Other types of creative product businesses tend to fall 
somewhere between the two, either consistently or on a project-by-
project basis.
As stated above, the publishing and studio businesses have slightly 
different value chains.
In the publishing industry, the creative process is fully outsourced 
and independent of the publisher. The publisher relies on a group 
of specialized professionals (e.g. editors in book publishing, Artists & 
Repertoire (A&R) executives in music publishing) to select potential 
winners from the vast range available. Often their work is assisted 
by outside intermediaries (agents), who cut down on the tedious 
trawling work otherwise associated with identifying potentially 
interesting works. The average US novel book publisher for example, 
selects only one out of fifteen thousand unsolicited manuscripts for 
actual publication. 
Having identified a potentially commercially viable work, the 
publisher will proceed to the production stage, for example jacket 
design, typesetting and printing in the case of book publishing and 
subsequently to distribution.
The studio approach is slightly different in that the business defines 
the creative concept and then sources creative input to deliver 
it (possibly from in-house teams). This is how most computer 
games companies operate – they identify a technology platform 
and creative concept and then source the necessary mixture of 
creative and non-creative work to deliver it (e.g. computer graphics, 
programming).
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Creative product industries generally have very high fixed costs and 
very low variable costs relative to turnover. Their opportunity for 
profitability lies in the possibility of replicating their product in large 
numbers at low cost and selling at high prices if (and only if ) the 
product becomes a hit.
It is therefore critically important for creative businesses to 
be able to restrict competitors from replicating their products. 
Understanding intellectual property rights is a key plank of running 
any creative product business. However, this is a complex area, and 
businesses are well advised to seek specialist legal advice for any 
non-trivial issues. 
MEDIA BUSINESSES
We define media businesses as businesses that deliver a recurring 
media product to consumers, to inform, educate or entertain 
them. The classic example of media businesses are mass media, i.e. 
newspapers, magazines and radio/TV. We include theatres and other 
‘venues’ (e.g. museums, galleries and auditoria) and film distribution 
and exhibition in this category. While they are less recurring than 
mass media (you do not necessarily go to the cinema every day), 
they have quite similar business characteristics i.e. they create and 
‘monetise’ audiences.
Media businesses have some similarities with creative product 
businesses, and the distinction is not always that clear-cut. While 
media businesses also deliver a creative product, it is much more 
varied and composed of multiple sources, as well as recurring, not 
just being a one-off. Any single creative product component – even 
that amazing Pulitzer Prize winning article – is unlikely to make 
much of an impact on the overall economics of the entire year. 
Instead of one blockbuster hit, the success of a media business 
is composed of more of a hard slog, many little hits, consistently 
delivered day in day out.
Media businesses share of a lot of issues with businesses outside the 
creative industries. For example, most media businesses will face the 
same issues of building strong brands as most (other) fast moving 
consumer goods (fmcg) businesses. Also, a lot of media businesses 
face production and distribution issues quite similar to consumer 
goods businesses. Cinemas meanwhile quite often earn a lot of their 
profits from movie snacks and hence also operate in the retailing/
fast food business.
There are in the main two types of business in this space.
The first type is the mass media business. These are businesses which 
deliver a media product they have produced themselves to a mass 
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audience through a remote medium such as TV, Radio, Broadband, 
Satellite, Newspapers, Newsletters and Magazines.
The second type is the venue/event business which stage live 
events in a physical space. Theatres, galleries, museums and stadia 
involve displays or performances, while events companies organize 
trade shows, concerts, launch parties and the like. Cinemas are 
similar to theatres in that they stage performances. However, the 
cinema performance is ‘canned’ while the theatre is live, and movies 
have considerably more mass appeal than stage performances. 
Hence cinemas are much more of a mass-market, almost industrial, 
operation.
The value chains of media businesses are fairly straightforward.
The first part is to source the content (e.g. editorial and advertising). 
The next part is producing it, e.g. layout and print in case of print 
publication, editing to a master tape in case of broadcast. Final part 
is distribution – simple for broadcast, major logistical issue for print.
Theatres and event venues can be somewhat simpler. Generally the 
venue (means of distribution) is at hand or can be rented relatively 
straightforwardly. They key focus becomes to get a good script and 
to execute it well (production).
Cinemas are the simplest of all – here the venue is at hand, and films 
are produced by someone else (or by another division in a movie 
conglomerate with an exhibition arm). There are really only two 
steps, sourcing the films (including negotiating fees) and showing.
HOW BIG ARE THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES?
Identifiable by SIC from 2004 Company House Data
Source: FAME, Amadeus
Taking the above classifications we can try and identify exactly how 
many firms fit into these categories and their economic impact. This 
was done by taking all the company house records from 2004 and 
manually allocating firms to the relevant group. 
,208 Companies, £122 bn revenue, 4,413 employees.
% of companies % of revenues % of employment
Creative process 8 % 0 % 40 %
Creative product 3 %  %  % *
Media  % 44 % 3 %
* 4,20
NB  Excludes many micro firms, sole traders (freelancers), 
partnerships and firms not identifiable by SIC.
© John Bates 2008
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What is immediately obvious is that Creative Product companies 
(those that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent 
and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property) represent a 
very small share of revenue (%) and employment (%) but a large 
number of firms (3%) – i.e. they are mainly small companies, many 
of whom on further analysis are struggling to attain any meaningful 
level of profitability or sustainability. However many of these firms 
and the rich ecosystem of independent creators that surround them, 
are essential to the health and growth potential of the Creative 
Process and Media businesses
Identifying, nurturing and applying creativity and providing the 
best possible chance for it to grow and generate future economic 
and social returns in the core creative product businesses is the key 
challenge for maintaining and growing a robust creative economy. 
GROWTH
The growth picture across UK creative industries is quite mixed, with 
some industries growing fast and others stagnating or in decline.
Looking at the period 199-2002, radio and TV, software, advertising 
and arts/antiques have grown very fast in revenue terms, at around 
10% p.a. sustained for five years. At these growth rates, an industry 
would more than double in size every seven years. Note that 
these growth rates do not include the impact of the advertising 
and general recession commencing in 2001, which have hit both 
advertising and media businesses very hard. Over the longer term 
however, the growth trend is real and significant.
At the other end of the spectrum, architecture and designer fashion 
have stalled. Figures for design were not available, but are likely to 
have moved more in sync with the economy as a whole.
On the employment side, the industries with growing revenues not 
surprisingly have increasing employment – though it is notable that 
employment is not growing as fast as revenues (i.e. businesses are 
becoming more efficient). 
As a result of the high historical growth followed by a marked 
slow down in the first few years of the new millennium the DCMS 
initiated an industry wide review of the creative industries (the 
Creative Economy Programme or CEP) that culminated in a report 
titled Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance Of The UK’s Creative 
Economy. This was published in July 200 as a precursor to a 
‘green paper’ of revised government policy for the sector. It was 
hoped (though not highly) that this would focus on three areas: 
3 3
Management capacity building, regulation to redress competition 
asymmetry and fiscal incentives to encourage investment in early 
stage ventures.
Apart from a fairly superficial review of the economic performance 
of the sector (to a great extent hampered by the lack of reliable, 
current or comparable data) this report gives a useful snapshot of 
the ‘creative economy’ and provides an extensive set of references 
to other literature of varying degrees of relevance. It and the 
subsequent report Creative Britain – New Talents For The New 
Economy, DCMS February 2008, can be downloaded at www.cep.
culture.gov.uk 
However a later report Beyond The Creative Industries, NESTA 2008, 
indicates that growth in the creative sector has stalled at around % 
of the UK labour force. 
GROWTH OF CREATIVE EMPLOYMENT AND SHIFT FROM 
EMBEDDED 1981 – 2001 BUT LITTLE GROWTH 2001 – 2006
Employment 
Category/Year
1981 1991 2001 20 year 
CAGR
LFS 2006 25 year 
CAGR
Creative
industries
44,80 98,900 1,242,811 .3% 1,28,042 4.3 %
Embedded in 
NON Creative
4,130 24,0 4,0 1.% 98,244 1. %
Total Creative 
Employment
903,000 1,123,0 1,88,88 3.8% 1,983,28 3.2 %
UK workforce 22,8,100 23,42,230 2,,80 0.8 28,1,12 0.8
Embedded 
share
1 % 4 % 34 % 3 %
Creative 
Employment 
as % of UK 
workforce
3.9 % 4.8 % .1 % .0 %
Beyond Creative Industries, NESTA 2008
WHAT IS GOING ON?
• Massive investment in and growth of Media businesses up to 
2000 but decline of print and increase productivity through 
technology stagnating employment growth.
COPYRIG
HT PROT
ECTED
38 39
• Growth by shift of embedded talent to Process (agency) 
businesses plus growth in export of services to 2000 but 
consolidation, international competition and cyclical downturn 
thereafter.
• Creative Product – < 0.% of national employment – poorly 
resourced and poorly managed but critical for the rest – why?
On the basis of these figures, and what we know about the creative 
product business we can estimate that the number of people 
engaged in creative product businesses may be around 138,000 
(% of 1,983,28) of whom 4,000 are in formal firms and 93,000 
‘independent’ authors, artists, designers etc. While I would not make 
any claims for the statistical validity of these figures the proportions 
‘feel’ about right. More importantly most of these ‘players’ (apart from 
the A list e.g. J.K. Rowling, Damien Hirst, Paul McCartney et fille etc.) 
fail to capture much of the value from their efforts.
Sadly this is for perfectly explicable reasons of risk and return.
RISK IN THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
The main sources of risk for the three types of creative industry are 
audience or market demand; the resources the business needs to 
produce creative outputs; and industry structure. The combination 
of these risk factors contribute to the overall risk profile of particular 
creative industries and hence the required return that investors of 
capital (whether it be financial or human) will require to take that 
risk.
WHY?
INVESTING IN THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES – THE RISKS
Demand Resource Industry Structure
Product “Nobody knows” 
but we must 
commit capital in 
advance.
Talent is capricious 
and expensive.
Gatekeepers have all 
the power.
Process Client may reject 
the pitch, but 
pitching is cheap.
Can mitigate against 
key man risk by 
scaling up.
Can match media 
owners’ power by 
scaling up.
Media Vulnerable to 
changes in taste.
Media companies 
are bigger and more 
powerful than their 
suppliers.
Scale economies and 
barriers to entry mean 
few or no competitors.
© John Bates 2008 © Bates and Rivers 200
Or to put it more graphically – in a traffic light system where the 
worst outlook is red, reasonable is amber and benign is green, 
creative product businesses receive red lights across the board.
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RISK IN THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
Demand Resource Industry Structure
Product ••• ••• •••
Process •• •• ••
Media •• • •
© John Bates 2008 © Bates and Rivers 200
DEMAND FAILURE
All creative businesses face the risk of demand failure, the possibility 
of rejection of the business’s offering by its target market. 
Creative content businesses feel the risk of demand failure acutely, 
since it is not feasible to market-test an incomplete creative product 
until a substantial amount of expenditure has already been incurred. 
For example, Hollywood test screenings take place after most of the 
production budget has been spent. The financial and legal strategies 
employed by creative content businesses to mitigate product failure 
include staging of investment decisions, deal structure, and portfolio 
diversification. We illustrate this with an example from the film 
industry.
Staging of investment decisions means the option during the 
production process to continue with a project or to kill it. If the 
script is good, the studio can increase the production budget. If 
the test screenings are poor, the studio can decided whether to 
re-edit, or to scale back marketing expenditure. Thus not all the 
investment required to launch a film need be committed upfront; 
investment decisions can be revised as new information about the 
chances of success or failure arrives. This flexibility is a source of 
value, and means that it may be rational for a studio to go ahead 
with a production even if it appears on paper that doing so will be 
unprofitable.
For the creative process business demand failure comes in two 
flavours: the volatility of demand at the macroeconomic level for 
the particular service that the business provides (the fluctuating 
demand for advertising, say, which is highly sensitive to the annual 
change in GDP), and at the level of the individual business the risk 
that a prospective client will reject the business’s pitch for new work.
While the amount of capital at stake in any one pitch is negligible 
(the opportunity cost of the account executive who put together the 
proposal), volatility of demand for creative process output creates 
a more serious challenge. To grow, the creative process business 
must invest in human capital – the smart people who will deliver 
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creative output. But labour is a fixed cost, hard to adjust quickly to 
rapid fluctuations in revenues. The challenge of adjustment may be 
compounded if the creative process business decides, having made 
its investment in recruitment and training, that it is unwilling to let 
people go when times turn bad.
One way in which the creative process business can address this 
challenge is by developing strong organisational competencies 
which enable it rapidly to mould new staff to ‘the way things 
are done here’. With such competencies in place, the creative 
process business may feel more relaxed about shedding staff if 
revenues decline. This is essentially the model of many strategy and 
management consultancies, who are ruthlessly efficient at letting 
people go during periods of contraction, and equally efficient at 
rapid recruitment and training when demand for their services pick 
up.
Historically demand failure has been less of a consideration for 
traditional media businesses serving mass markets, where these 
have enjoyed the status of monopoly provider or faced only limited 
competition. This is no longer the case, as the case of Channel 4 
illustrates. The company operates as a publisher, with low overhead 
and few assets, outsourcing all programme making to independent 
production companies. Administration costs are less than % of 
total expenditure, and net operating assets are less than 40% of total 
revenues. The business runs a lean, asset-light operation.
The channel’s viewing demographic is highly attractive to advertisers 
(18 – 40, ABC1s) and as a result it has outperformed other terrestrial 
television channels in terms of capturing advertising revenues:
As a result, the channel has been successful financially, earning a 
return on capital in excess of its cost of capital in three of the past 
four years, an impressive achievement for an entity with a strong 
public service remit. However, the NOPLAT margin (net operating 
profit less adjusted taxes) is tight, and it would take only a small 
change in the channel’s fortunes for profits to turn negative:
Other terrestrial commercial broadcasters are highly likely to 
find themselves facing a crunch similar to Channel 4’s; declining 
advertising revenues and rising programming costs. The next five 
years will be unpleasant for investors, suppliers and employees in 
the TV broadcast sector.
44 4
RESOURCE RISK
For creative industries resource risk means above all the challenges 
associated with managing human capital, and it poses a 
considerable challenge for creative content businesses, reliant as 
they are on the whims of capricious talent. EMI’s recent experience 
demonstrates the point. On th February 200 the company 
announced that albums by two of its major bands – Coldplay and 
Gorillaz – would be delayed. Late release means cash flows deferred, 
and hence lower present value today; EMI’s share price fell sharply 
on the news.
For creative process businesses scaling up is one way of mitigating 
key man risk (the danger of losing a key account executive, say), so 
that the departure of any one staff member has minimal impact on 
the enterprise as a whole. As we have already seen, the development 
of strong organisational competencies that make it easy to slot in 
new staff members to established creative routines is another. This 
can be a source of competitive advantage, and hence value, if the 
business succeeds in developing organisational competencies that 
customers value and that are hard for competitors to emulate.
The existence of such competencies is a rebuttal to view that creative 
process businesses are an unattractive investment opportunity 
because their most important assets walk out of the door every 
evening. If the business can reliably replicate the processes that give 
it competitive advantage, scaling up (and down) as required to meet 
changing demand, then the source of the business’s value lies not in 
untethered human capital, but in the organisational competencies 
themselves. A business which possesses such competencies can 
represent an attractive investment opportunity.
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Industry structure again makes life hard for many types of content 
production companies, since access to markets is controlled by 
gatekeepers; games developers must rely on games publishers, and 
film producers on studios to get their product in front of a paying 
public. The potential for gatekeepers to capture value is illustrated 
by the computer games industry, where games developers 
frequently struggle to generate substantial profits, but games 
publishers can earn a substantial spread above their cost of capital.
Resource requirements and industry structure pose fewer risks to 
traditional media companies; they have more muscle than their 
employees (journalists, programme producers), and scale economies 
and barriers to entry mean they face limited direct competition.
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RISK AND TIME
The combination of demand, resource, and industry structure risk 
can combine to make life bleak for creative content businesses. 
However, the outlook is far from hopeless; the risk profile of creative 
content businesses can change quite markedly over time. Consider a 
major record label. Each year it releases a certain number of albums 
by established artists and new bands. At the moment the label 
agrees to a production deal it cannot forecast with certainty how 
the album it has contracted to release will perform, but once in the 
shops the recordings financial performance is known, information 
that is a reliable guide to its likely future earnings. As the size of 
the record label’s back catalogue grows the business’s earnings 
become more stable, both because sales from risky new titles form a 
declining proportion of total sales, and because back catalogue sales 
are less volatile.
Furthermore, once the content has been delivered – the film 
wrapped, the album recorded – the content business need not 
worry about the challenge of managing wayward or temperamental 
talent, thus the content business’s resource risk diminishes. Industry 
structure risk declines too; while gatekeepers hold all the chips when 
negotiating on distribution terms for new content whose value is 
unknown, broadcasters and other distributors are always hungry for 
proven, high quality content; broadcasters will continue to pay high 
prices for the rights to The Sound of Music for many years to come. 
Hence established content businesses, with large back catalogues, 
can have extremely low risk profiles:
RISK AND TIME IN CREATIVE PRODUCT BUSINESSES:
THE BACKLIST EFFECT
Demand Resource Business Model
Product • • •
Process
Value of product 
is known
No talent involved 
once product is made
Gatekeepers are 
hungry for proven 
content
Vulnerable to 
changes in taste.
Media companies 
are bigger and more 
powerful than their 
suppliers.
Scale economies 
and barriers to entry 
mean few or no 
competitors.
Earnings 
volatility
© John Bates 2008 © Bates and Rivers 200
Time
Lower risk
Debt, private equity
Public markets
VC
Angels
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As the risk profile of a creative content business changes, so to 
should its sources of capital. An early-stage music label or film 
production company is best suited to investors with a high appetite 
for risk; angels and VCs. As the business matures, public equity 
markets become a more appropriate source of capital. Once it has 
a substantial back catalogue the business should be generating 
stable, abundant and predictable revenues. It is not unknown 
for the managers of such businesses to be profligate, to gamble 
excess cash on ill-considered investment decisions, or otherwise to 
waste shareholders’ money. The optimal financial structure for such 
businesses is a highly geared balance sheet, since debt imposes 
discipline on otherwise profligate managers. Shareholders in such 
businesses should either press existing management themselves to 
increase the debt:equity ratio, or sell out to private equity, which will 
in its turn finance the business with substantial debt.
Creative content businesses which have substantial back catalogues, 
generating stable, low-risk revenues, and which also continue to 
invest in new artists, create a conundrum for investors; it is arguable 
that such businesses should be broken up, as the case of EMI 
illustrates.
EMI has two divisions. EMI Music generates revenues from the sales 
of artists’ sound recordings by discovering new acts, signing them, 
and, if they are successful, promoting them and further developing 
their careers. EMI Music Publishing, the world’s largest music 
publisher, makes its money by acquiring or administering rights in 
music copyrights and licensing those rights to end users in exchange 
for royalty payments and/or fees.
Whereas EMI Music’s revenues are volatile, those of EMI Music 
Publishing are stable, predictable and abundant. As a result one 
would expect the optimal capital structure and shareholder base 
for each division to be markedly different. Publishing can support 
high debt levels, and should appeal to shareholders wanting stable 
returns, whereas Music can’t support much debt, and is better 
suited to shareholders with the stomach for high-risk investments. 
Furthermore there is good reason to believe that keeping the two 
divisions together is destroying shareholder value, by creating a 
conglomerate discount.
The risk profile of creative businesses inevitably has implications for 
investment strategies, which we now consider in more detail.
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FINANCING THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
Investors will only commit capital to an investment which they 
believe will provide them with a return on capital equal to or 
(ideally) greater than the cost of capital. That is, investors will only 
part with their capital if the enterprise generates returns sufficient 
to compensate them for the risk that all of their capital might be lost. 
The cost of capital can be thought of as an insurance premium, and 
the greater the risks faced by the enterprise, the higher the cost of 
capital will be.
We have seen that creative businesses face demand, resource, and 
industry structure risk, although creative content businesses can 
become substantially less risky over time. Investors will only invest     
in the creative industries if they believe that creative businesses 
have the resources – IP, know how, strategy or organizational 
competencies – to master those risks sufficiently to earn a positive 
spread on capital. 
We focus primarily on investment in creative content businesses 
because we believe the high degree of risk and competition 
asymmetry in these industries make attracting fresh investment a 
particularly hard challenge.
CREATIVE INDUSTRY REVISITED
The greatest challenge by far is the formation and growth of new 
creative product businesses which are at the heart of the so called 
‘creative’ industries of which creativity is the lifeblood.
• The concept of Creative industries is a convenient fiction – it has 
provided a focus for a debate about the role of creative activity in 
the economy and an antidote to the manufacturing or services 
only agenda.
• The reality is that there is a cottage industry of Creative Product 
firms and an informal ecosystem of creative talent and craft skills.
• This supports much larger, more formal Creative Process and 
Media industries that are ex growth and desperate for genuinely 
new ideas- for real creativity!
SO WHAT?
• Creative output is at the heart of future national cultural and 
economic wealth – it should be at the heart of our industrial 
strategy.
• Creators need to learn how to capture more of the value they 
create – this is primarily a management problem.
• If we focus on an arbitrary ‘Creative Industries’ we miss the point 
– the real challenge is that there is a shortage of creativity in 
industry.
2 3
HOW DO WE PUT THE CREATIVE BACK INTO INDUSTRY
• For practitioners we must recognise creativity is not the same as 
creative problem solving.
• For educators we must recognise that creativity requires ‘open 
and connected’ thinking – not just skills. 
• For both we must accept that NOT everyone can be creative 
– achieving and maintaining the ‘defocused attention’ required is 
a talent. 
• Developing and nurturing that talent is a huge challenge to 
accepted business and educational models
CREATIVITY – ALIGNING THE FORCES
after Teresa Amabile How To Kill Creativity
© John Bates 2008
MANAGEMENT GOAL UNITY, DRIVE AND COMMITMENT
In any business it is critical that the entire founder and initial 
management team have the same overall goal for the business and 
are equally committed to carrying it out.
The first obstacle here is that very many creative business founders 
are in fact not willing to make the tradeoffs required in terms of 
business focus, hard work and delegation in order to move from a 
small lifestyle business to a large, professionally run business. This is 
a management challenge.
The most obvious candidates for the ‘lifestyle’ business epithet are 
those who do not want to give up evenings or weekends to drive 
the business forward – but they are by no means the only ones. 
Lifestyle businesses also include a large group of hard-working 
operators, who however see the business as an extension of their 
own personality, making them unwilling to provide pragmatic 
solutions that customers want, or delegating power to professional 
management.
Situations with multiple founders/ partners can be particularly 
complicated, as very often they do not want the same thing. Unless 
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however all active founders/ partners are signed up to the same 
vision, and equally willing to make sacrifices, there won’t be a solid 
growth foundation for the business.
Fixing this problem requires identifying it and agreeing how to 
resolve it, for example by drafting a detailed business plan and 
partners/ shareholder’s agreement. However agreeing on how to 
maintain creativity, particularly creativity in a team environment as 
the firm grows is crucial. 
CREATIVE TEAMS CAN DO MORE
after Gordon Torr Managing Creative People.
Enhancers Inhibitors
•     Good project management.
•     Clear transparent briefings.
•     Encouragement.
•     Constraint (habit, groupthink).
•     Inappropriate time pressure.
•     Disinterest.
The Manger’s Job
•     Remove constraints.
•     Provide adequate resources and compensation.
•     Close off easy exits.
•     Set realistic timescales.
•     Monitor and encourage without intrusive surveillance.
•     This is an entreprenurial challenge!.
© John Bates 2008
ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGEMENT 
Entrepreneurial managers are those individuals who are responsible 
for the health and direction of an enterprise i.e. its strategy. The 
role of a entrepreneurial manager is to create and then execute a 
compelling overall strategy for the business. It’s said there’s two 
keys to execution: leadership and management. Leadership is the 
ability to enthuse and excite customers, staff and investors about the 
business, including during difficult times. Management is the ability 
to ‘make the trains run on time’ – delivering an effective and efficient 
organisation. To really be effective, managers need a combination of 
both. This is Entrepreneurial management. 
In most cases this is found not in a single individual but in an explicit 
or implicit pairing of people – the ‘binary stars’ that build great 
businesses. Think of Hewlett and Packard, Honda and Fujisawa (the 
marketing brain behind Honda’s success), Terence Conran and Des 
Gunewardera, or Julian Metcalfe and Sinclair Beecham (the founders 
of Pret a Manger who famously said “without me Pret wouldn’t exist 
– without him it wouldn’t work”). 
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ENTREPRENURIAL MANAGEMENT – CAPTURING VALUE
adapted from Howard Stevenson The Heart Of Entrepreneurship.
Creativity and
inventiveness
Inventor/Artist
Entrepreneurial 
Management
Promoter Trustee Manager
Managerial skills
© John Bates 2008
Many founders of creative businesses find Entrepreneurial 
management a difficult and frustrating role to fill – its very different 
from the creative disciplines they built their previous career around 
– finding the right partners and colleagues is central to success.
Common problems in creative businesses are:
• Creative business founders may be very good at their creative 
function but are disorganized managers and/or uninspired 
leaders.
• Insufficient focus on proper financial management and controls
• Lack of a focused marketing and sales effort.
• Poor talent management.
There are two main ways of fixing this problem, either to train 
existing founders/ management or to bring in new, professional 
management. My preference is for the former.
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION
The purpose of my New Creative Ventures for Masters level students 
at LBS and UAL is to facilitate the development of creative business 
opportunities from their entrepreneurial origins to large-scale, 
thriving creative businesses. What constitutes large-scale and 
thriving will vary from business to business, but as rough benchmark 
going from nothing to a business with thirty employees, £m 
turnover and 10% net margin in three to five years would be a 
reasonable target.
In looking at growth constraints facing creative businesses, there are 
three overall sets, from which most other problems derive.
1. Understanding the difference between an idea and a real 
opportunity.
2. Lack of founder/management goal unity, drive and commitment.
3. Lack of execution skills.
HIGH
LOW
LOW HIGHCOPYRIG
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Ideas are not the same as opportunities. Anyone can come up with 
a good idea whereas it takes a real entrepreneur to spot, shape and 
execute on a business opportunity. Assessing whether an idea is a 
good opportunity or not is at the heart of entrepreneurship. This 
topic is large and covered in great detail in John Mullins’ book The 
New Business Road Test: What Entrepreneurs And Executives Should Do 
Before Writing A Business Plan. (FT Prentice hall 2003). 
However suffice to say that an awareness of the possibilities and 
changes that are taking place in materials, technology, society 
culture and demographics (amongst others) and the ability to spot 
patterns before others do then act upon them is the heart of both 
entrepreneurship and creativity. Combining this with a disciplined 
approach to thinking about the team and organisation that will 
deliver, the markets the business will serve and the industry that the 
firm is operating in to build a strong sustainable enterprise is a hard 
but achievable task. 
We can teach entrepreneurial skills across a wide range of courses 
and programmes. This is about developing a high capacity to:  
• Tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity.
• Build a team and provide leadership.
• Deal with failure.
• Seek and use feedback.
• Persistently problem solve.
• Take a long term view forward.
• Not look back (except to learn).
However we can only nurture and enable entrepreneurial attitudes.
• Total commitment, determination and perseverance.
• Desire to achieve and grow.
• Opportunity focused, not risk focused.
• Internal locus of control: accepting responsibility.
• Independent sense of identity.
• Decisive use of urgency and patience.
Are we doing enough to develop these skills and encourage these 
attitudes in the next generation of leaders in creative businesses?
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